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In November 2018, the consensus that investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) needs to be 
reformed received multilateral imprint: UNCITRAL’s Working Group III agreed that reform 
is “desirable” with respect to (1) consistency, coherence, predictability, and correctness of 
arbitral rulings; (2) independence, impartiality and diversity of decision-makers; and (3) costs 
and duration of proceedings.1 
 
Recent investment agreements entered into by key international actors demonstrate a 
willingness to advance along the same lines. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (which succeeded the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
after the US withdrawal), the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) concluded between the EU and 
Canada, Brazil’s Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs),2 and India's 
2016 model bilateral investment treaty (BIT), all seek increased transparency, enhanced 
efficiency and the implementation of mechanisms for more effective state control over 
substantive rules and their interpretations. 
 
However, in relation to dispute-settlement design, these key models diverge starkly. The 
CPTPP and the USMCA, which texts reflect the US position, retain investor-state arbitration 
but reform it. The EU is proposing the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) 
that would replace investment arbitration entirely.3 India's model BIT strengthens the role of 
domestic courts by re-introducing the exhaustion of local remedies rule. Finally, Brazil's CIFAs 
feature inter-state adjudication rather than ISDS. 
 
It is of course tempting to seek multilateral consensus by opening a debate about the pros and 
cons of each model; in fact, this is what the proponents of each model currently do, within 
UNCITRAL and beyond. At the same time, it is unlikely that one model will find universal 
support, as the different positions on investment dispute-settlement design reflect largely 
entrenched political stances. The predictable outcome of every party sticking to its own 
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model—institutional fragmentation—threatens the achievement of key objectives of the 
current reform process, in particular the aim to enhance consistency, coherence and 
predictability. Therefore, the question arises whether the Gordian Knot can be cut, and the 
mutually incompatible dispute-settlement design models reconciled. 
 
We propose adding to UNCITRAL’s agenda discussions on the establishment of a Multilateral 
Institution for Dispute Settlement on Investment (MIDSI), which could provide an umbrella 
for “dispute settlement à la carte”. Building on the idea of an “open architecture”4 and the 
approach to dispute settlement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea,5 a 
MIDSI would not feature compulsory jurisdiction, but would rather allow states and 
organizations to opt into the dispute-settlement mechanism of their choice. Apart from 
administering inter-state and investor-state arbitrations, the MIDSI would also encompass, as 
one of its pillars, the proposed MIC. 
 
On an opt-in basis, the MIC could perform different roles for different states, serving as a fully-
fledged two-tiered investment court for some and as an appeals body or annulment institution 
for others. Even for those that do not opt to use it for adjudication, the MIC could carry out 
such procedural functions as deciding on challenges to arbitrators or rendering provisional 
measures before an arbitral tribunal is constituted. Finally, the MIC could perform “systemic” 
functions that are currently absent in investment dispute settlement, such as issuing advisory 
opinions or rulings on preliminary references by arbitral tribunals or even national courts, thus 
providing clarity on specific points of interpretation and resolving inconsistencies that have 
arisen under the current system. 
 
The MIDSI, of which the MIC is part, could also serve as a forum for future investment treaty 
negotiations. While at the outset it could be expected that the law applicable to investment 
disputes would remain fragmented, over time states could use the MIDSI to collectively 
develop new rules, addressing for example standards of protection or investor obligations. 
 
A key challenge in reforming investment dispute settlement is to prevent the divergent models 
and proposals currently being floated from leading to a fragmented system. The establishment 
of a MIDSI would address that risk. It would provide a solution for disagreements on dispute-
settlement design by establishing an institutional framework within which participants can 
agree to disagree—and still effectively cooperate multilaterally in settling investment disputes 
and shaping the future of the international investment regime. Such an institutional framework 
would not only promote procedural convergence in investment dispute settlement, but could 
also provide states with a long-term tool for building a comprehensive investment governance 
system, including substantive matters. 
 
While details of organizational structure, mandate, competence, and relations to existing 
institutions, including the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes or the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, would need to be negotiated, establishing a MIDSI would 
create a structure for consensus-building, adjudication and negotiation at the multilateral level 
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and reassure states that they remain sovereign to decide on their preferred model for settling 
investment disputes. 
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